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ABSTRACT:  One of the most important political challenges of our time – indeed of all times – 
is social justice.  It was first addressed as a philosophical issue in Plato’s great dialogue, the 
Republic, and it has been a continuing theme in the “tradition of discourse” ever since.  As I will 
argue, Plato’s analysis and conclusions represent a sound foundation and a starting point for 
advancing a new social justice paradigm that is undergirded by the emerging, multi-disciplinary 
science of human nature, which is briefly overviewed here.  I refer to it as a “biosocial 
contract,” and it involves three empirically-grounded fairness precepts – equality, equity, and 
reciprocity -- that together form a new normative framework for guiding social policy.  The 
obvious logical objection to such a normative undertaking, commonly referred to as the 
“naturalistic fallacy,” is briefly considered from the perspective of the biological problem of 
survival and reproduction and the fundamental nature of a human society as, quintessentially, 
a “collective survival enterprise.” Logic aside, the reality is that we are all required to make 
unavoidable choices.  
KEYWORDS:  Social justice; fairness; Plato; Sophists; Hobbes; Locke; Rousseau; Rawls; basic 
needs; equality, equity, reciprocity; naturalistic fallacy. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The moral foundation for any “legitimate” (i.e., consensually acceptable) society is 
social justice, an insight that traces back to Plato – the very fountainhead of Western 
political philosophy.  Social justice also goes under the heading of “fairness,” and in an 
organized society it entails a system of reciprocities commonly referred to as a “social 
contract.”  
After more than 2,500 years of inconclusive philosophical debate about social 
justice and the social contract, the emerging science of human nature, along with 
recent theoretical insights from a number of scientific disciplines, are shedding new 
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light on the subject.  Here I will revisit Plato’s foundational argument and will then 
provide a brief overview of the contributions from various disciplines.  I will argue that 
these important scientific findings point to three complementary normative principles 
– equality, equity, and reciprocity -- that together can provide a scientifically-grounded 
framework for social justice.  I refer to it as the “biosocial contract,” and it is developed 
in depth in my 2011 book The Fair Society: The Science of Human Nature and the Pursuit of 
Social Justice.1 Among other things, I will argue here that this framework allows us to 
finesse the otherwise debilitating naturalistic fallacy, as well as providing concrete 
guidance for the formation of social policy – fulfilling Plato’s aspiration for a political 
philosophy that truly informs and enlightens our politics.  
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 101: PLATO’S REPUBLIC   
A philosophy that loses touch with reality is no better than superstition, a self-
indulgent and possibly dangerous pastime.  But a philosophy that is informed by 
“science” in the broad sense can be a powerful and useful tool, providing guidance 
about how individuals and societies can confront the many challenges of living, 
ultimately enabling them to thrive.  A philosophy informed by science can become a 
discipline with a higher social purpose.  
An underappreciated role-model for such an empirically-grounded philosophy is 
the very progenitor of Western political thought, Plato.  In his classic dialogue, the 
Republic, Plato posed the right questions about social justice, and he based his responses 
(through his spokesperson Socrates) in the best available evidence of his day.  Plato’s 
analysis and prescriptions remain a useful starting point even today. So let us begin 
with Plato.  
Plato was born in Athens in about 427 B.C., at the tail-end of that ancient city-
state’s legendary Golden Age, and he grew to maturity during Athens’ disastrous 27-
year Peloponnesean War with Sparta.2  It was a period of great suffering and social 
1 Peter Corning, The Fair Society: The Science of Human Nature and the Pursuit of Social Justice, (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
2 The following brief synopsis is drawn from a much more detailed account of Athens’ Golden Age and 
subsequent decline (a dark lesson for our times) in my 2011 book. It utilized the following sources: Peter 
Connolly, The Ancient City: Life in Classical Athens and Rome, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977); 
Plutarch, Lives, [ca. 46-120 A.D.],  New York, Modern Library, 2001;  John Boardman,  Jasper 
Griffin, and Oswyn Murray, (eds.), Oxford History of Greece & the Hellenistic World.  2nd ed., (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Robin Waterfield, Athens: A History, From Ancient Ideal to Modern City, (New 
York, Basic Books, 2004); Edward M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, 
Society, and Politics.  (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006); Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M. 
Burstein, Walter Donlan, and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Ancient Greece: A Political, Social and Cultural History, 
2nd ed., (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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stress for the population (including a devastating plague), and it ended in a humiliating 
defeat for the Athenians and occupation by the Spartans.  In the aftermath of the war, 
an impoverished, demoralized, angry population became deeply divided politically, 
and economic tensions ran high.  Most of Athens’ wealth was now concentrated in the 
hands of 5-10% of the population, while 60-70% lived in more or less severe poverty.  
Some historians describe the post-war oligarchy (the so called Thirty Tyrants) as a 
reign of terror.  Eventually Athens’ vaunted democracy was restored in name, but it 
really amounted to another radical oligarchy.  Political extremists on both sides had 
become the dominant players in shaping public policy.  This was the Athens that 
shaped Plato’s perspective.   
It is no wonder, then, that Plato chose not to use Athens as the model state in his 
great dialogue, the Republic.33 Instead, he went back to the drawing board and tried to 
design an ideal state that he believed could resolve the fundamental problem of social 
injustice. Indeed, the little-known and seldom-used subtitle of the Republic is 
“Concerning Justice.”  Call it social engineering.   
To anticipate my bottom line assessment of the Republic, Plato had the right 
diagnosis but the wrong prescription.  Yet, to his everlasting credit, Plato later 
recognized the flaws in his design and, in his last essay (the Laws), pointed the way to a 
far better solution to the problem of achieving a reasonably just state.4 This is why it is 
often said (after the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead) that the history of political 
theory is but a footnote to Plato, although it might be more accurate to call it a trans-
generational dialogue with Plato.5 
At the outset of the Republic Plato raises and rebuts some of the other ideas about 
politics that were then “in the air” in Athens, many of them attributable to the 
Sophists. The Sophists were a group of itinerant teachers whose pupils included many 
of Athens’ wealthy aristocrats, who paid generously for being told what they wanted to 
hear.  Among other things, the Sophists taught the idea that all laws are merely social 
conventions and that each individual has the right to define for himself (or herself) 
what is right and wrong.  For instance, the Sophist Antiphon suggested that some laws 
3 Plato, The Republic, [380 B.C.], Trans. B. Jowett, (Cleveland, OH, World Publishing Company, 1946). 
See also Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory, [1918], (London, Methuen, 1960) and George H. Sabine, A 
History of Political Theory, 3rd ed., (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961). 
4 Plato, The Laws,[ca. 360 B.C.], (New York, Penguin Books, 1992a).  Also, see Plato, The Statesman, [360 
B.C.], (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett Publishing Co., 1992b). 
5 This is why, in my judgment, the Republic and the Laws – along with the Politics of Aristotle (Plato’s most 
illustrious student and the world’s first great polymath) – should be required reading for every modern 
statesman.  Aristotle, the Politics, [350 B.C.], Trans. Earnest Barker, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1946). Also, see Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, [350 B.C.], Trans. Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1985). 
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may even require us to do what is “unnatural” – helping others.  What is natural is to 
pursue your self-interest.   
Later Sophists went even further, arguing that all laws arise from a voluntary 
compact that can be changed or even subverted, if desired.  Since inequality is a basic 
law of nature, and we are inherently unequal, justice is whatever the strongest and 
most powerful can impose on others.  Thus, the character Thrasymachus in the 
Republic declares that justice is nothing more than “the interest of the stronger.” Some 
of the later Sophists were even more reactionary.  They attacked the supposed 
selfishness of the masses and claimed that democracy allowed the poor to exploit the 
rich!  
Plato’s rebuttal to all of these egocentric and individualistic (pre-libertarian?) 
arguments proceeded from his core assumptions about the very nature and purpose of 
human societies.  To Plato, justice is not primarily concerned with some higher 
metaphysics, or a tug-of-war over our rights as individuals.  It is concerned with 
equitable rewards for the proper exercise of our abilities and our calling in a network 
of interdependent economic relationships. Moreover, and this point is crucial, Plato 
recognized that fairness also is rooted in our “basic needs.” Here are Plato’s words in 
the Republic: 
If we begin our inquiry by examining the beginning of a city, would that not aid 
us also in identifying the origins of justice and injustice?...A city -- or a state -- is a 
response to human needs.  No human being is self-sufficient, and all of us have 
many wants...Since each person has many wants, many partners and purveyors 
will be required to furnish them....Owing to this interchange of services, a 
multitude of persons will gather and dwell together in what we have come to call 
the city or the state....[So] let us construct a city beginning with its origins, 
keeping in mind that the origin of every real city is human necessity....[However], 
we are not all alike.  There is a diversity of talents among men; consequently, one 
man is best suited to one particular occupation and another to another....We can 
conclude, then, that production in our city will be more abundant and the 
products more easily produced and of better quality if each does the work nature 
[and society] has equipped him to do, at the appropriate time, and is not 
required to spend time on other occupations....Where, then, do we find justice 
and injustice?...Perhaps they have their origins in the mutual needs of the city’s 
inhabitants.6  
In other words, Plato correctly identified the underlying (biological) purpose of a 
human society – to provide for the basic survival and reproductive needs of its 
members -- and he fully apprehended one of its fundamental advantages, an economic 
6 Plato, Republic, 2.396a-d, 370b, c, 372a.. 
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division of labor and specialization of roles.  (He might also have mentioned the 
additional benefit of jointly-produced collective goods, or public goods.)  Plato also 
specifically characterized a human society as being like an organism with many parts 
(presaging Herbert Spencer’s “superorganism” analogy, which many modern 
biologists have adopted).  Most important, Plato grasped the core political challenge – 
to achieve social justice (fairness) for all the members of what can properly be called 
the “collective survival enterprise.”  He also defined social justice in a way that has 
withstood the test of time.  In the words of one of Plato’s characters, Polymarchus, it 
involves “giving every man his due.” 
There have been countless debates through the centuries over what Plato meant 
by the word “due”.  But a common sense interpretation is that the rewards provided 
by society should start with a person’s all-important basic needs but then also reflect 
their contributions (or punish their crimes and misdeeds).  Plato clearly did not mean 
equality per se.  Rather, he meant an equitable portion in accordance with some 
criterion of fairness -- a fair share.  Aristotle also used the term “proportionate 
equality.” (There is also a voluminous scholarly literature, especially in welfare 
economics, on Aristotle’s related concept of “distributive equity.”)77  
Plato got several ingredients right, I believe, in his basic recipe for how to go about 
achieving social justice in a complex society.  One key ingredient was his insistence 
that any system of government must seek to be disinterested, or non-partisan, and 
should seek to rule in the public interest – in other words, in a manner that is fair to all 
of the classes and interests in a society.  A second ingredient was Plato’s deep 
conviction that education is vitally important to achieving and sustaining social justice.  
Many of the troubles he saw around him could be traced to unenlightened attitudes 
and behaviors that were socially destructive.  They invited an unbridled selfishness and 
a wanton disregard for the public interest. Ignorance is “the ruin of states,” he 
maintained.88  
Finally, Plato recognized what many of the Sophists of his day (and many 
conservative economists and libertarians today) failed to acknowledge.  A human 
society is not simply a market place or an aggregation of isolated individuals seeking to 
exploit one another, or to be free from one another.  Humans are fundamentally social 
animals who are shaped by, and benefit from, participation in the life of the 
community.  So a harmonious society provides important social and psychological 
benefits, as well as economic necessities.   
7 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, 5. Aristotle’s term “distributive equity” can be found at ibid., Book 
V, 10. 
8 Plato, Laws, Book III. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 20 
It would appear that Plato’s assumptions represent a sturdy foundation upon 
which to build a political system that embodies social justice.  Where Plato took a 
wrong turn was with his prescription for how to achieve this – namely, his ideal state.   
What Plato proposed, in a nutshell, is that political power should be entrusted to 
specially educated and trained “philosopher kings” who would have no personal 
property, who would live communally as celibates, and who would therefore rule in 
the public interest.  It has often been noted that Plato was not a democrat; he 
distrusted what has sometimes been referred to as “mobocracy”.  Thus, he preferred 
an authoritarian model – a benevolent dictatorship.  The masses would be ruled over 
like children by wise, disinterested rulers.  Pure reason would prevail over our “animal 
spirits” and selfish interests. 
Some of the problems with this model are obvious.  No amount of education can 
completely erase and re-write human nature – our evolved “spirits” and “appetites” (to 
borrow some of Plato’s terminology).  The landscape of history is littered with political 
(and religious) leaders who, in the end, had feet of clay.  Furthermore, some of us are 
less teachable, more impulsive, and more strong-willed than others.  Plato 
overestimated the power of education to teach self-restraint and self-sacrifice.  Equally 
important, a desire for autonomy and personal freedom are also an important part of 
human nature.  Not only may we deeply resent being told how, precisely, to live our 
lives but we may actually know better than any philosopher king (since they could not 
be omniscient) what we are fitted for and what is best for us – although sometimes our 
parents, families, friends, and teachers can be helpful.  So, at a deep level, Plato’s 
psychology was seriously deficient (see below).  
 When Plato set out to write the Laws, near the end of his life, his views had 
drastically changed.  Now he had come around to the idea that the next best thing to 
an all-powerful, all-knowing and benevolent sovereign was the sovereignty of the law.   
Plato’s overall objective remained the same – to secure social justice – but he had 
come to the view that the law represented a repository of collective experience and 
wisdom that had been painstakingly -- and sometimes painfully -- accumulated by a 
society over the course of time.  At its best, the law represents a body of rules, norms 
and practices that are generally accepted as being just (fair) – “reason unaffected by 
desire” as Aristotle put it in the Politics.9  If everyone, including the “rulers”, were 
equally subject to the law, and if everyone were treated equitably under the law, this 
would go a long way toward ensuring a just society.  Plato called it the “golden cord” 
of law.10  
9 Aristotle, Politics, 1287a33. 
10 Plato, Laws, Book IV. Also, see the discussion in Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 71-78. 
                                                          
 PETER A. CORNING 21 
But Plato also recognized that something more is needed to achieve a just society,  
namely, a set of political institutions that will govern in a way that furthers the 
underlying purpose of society and advances social justice.  It is here that Plato made 
perhaps his most important contribution to political science.  He initiated a dialogue 
about what kind of government would best be able to ensure social justice.  Instead of 
investing power in the hands of a philosopher king, or turning it over to the masses, 
Plato suggested that any government is more likely to be just and equitable if it reflects 
an amalgam of the various interests and classes in society – the public interest -- and 
strikes a balance between them.  
Plato’s great student, Aristotle, elaborated on the idea of a “mixed government” in 
the Politics and the later Greek historian Polybius (200-118 B.C) took up the idea and 
proposed that it should combine democratic (egalitarian) elements, aristocratic 
elements and even strong leadership in the form of a “monarchical” element.11 
Polybius used the Roman Republic as his model.  If everyone in society is fairly 
represented, this would provide “checks and balances” and would impel them to work 
toward compromises that balance various interests, including the property interests of 
the rich and the basic needs and wants of the rest of society.  As Plato had insisted, the 
key political challenge is fairness – social justice.  The problem is rooted in human 
nature.  
HUMAN NATURE IN THE “TRADITION OF DISCOURSE” 
It is not surprising, then, that the concept of human nature has played a central part in 
our social and political dialogue over the course of history and continues to shape our 
views about social justice even today.  As Steven Pinker points out in his best-selling 
tour-de-force on our modern-day misconceptions (and biases) about human nature, 
appropriately titled The Blank Slate: 
Everyone has a theory of human nature….Our theory of human nature is the 
wellspring of much of our lives. We consult it when we want to persuade, or threaten, 
inform or deceive.  It advises us on how to nurture our marriages, bring up our 
children, and control our own behavior…Rival theories of human nature are 
entwined in different ways of life and different political systems, and have been a 
source of much conflict over the course of history.12 
11 See especially the discussion in Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 77-80. Also,   Polybius, The 
Histories, trans. Robin Waterford, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
12 Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature,  (New York, Viking Penguin, 2002), p. 
1. 
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Pinker might also have pointed out that the great political philosophers over the 
centuries have likewise anchored and undergirded their theories with various 
assumptions about human nature.  For instance, Plato, in the Republic, divided what he 
called the “soul” into three elements, “appetitive” (nutrition, sex, etc.), “spirited” 
(emotions, ambition, competitive urges, etc.), and a rational, reasoning element, which 
he viewed as the primary function of the brain.  These three elements can either be in 
harmony or at war with one another, Plato argued, so it is imperative for the rational 
element in each of us to exercise control over the urges and impulses that arise from 
below. 
Human societies confront a similar challenge, Plato believed, and in the Republic he 
envisioned that his ideal state would be comprised of three social classes that roughly 
corresponded to the three elements of our individual souls.  If humans with varying 
talents and temperaments are properly educated and trained -- from manual laborers 
to soldiers to philosopher kings – and are then given the work for which they are 
suited, the result would be a harmonious and just society, which Plato characterized as 
a sort of moral organism.  Justice, therefore, accords with our character as social 
animals.  As Plato expressed it, we are just by nature.13 
The radically individualistic, self-centered model of human nature embraced by 
the Sophists has also had a continuing voice in the trans-generational dialogue.  For 
instance, the fourth century (B.C.) Greek philosopher, Epicurus, writing at a time 
when a dispirited Greece had become a vassal of the Roman Empire, adopted the 
Sophist argument that human nature is governed by self-interest, and that what the 
self desires above all is to obtain happiness and avoid pain and stress.  There are, 
therefore, no intrinsic moral rules, only variable customs. Epicurus tells us: “There 
never was an absolute justice but only a convention made in mutual intercourse, in 
whatever region, from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of 
harm.”14 
The Sophist and Epicurean model of human nature reappeared again in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the writings of the so-called utilitarian 
philosophers and early classical economists -- most notably in the work of Jeremy 
13 Plato, Republic, Book II, Book VI.  It should be noted that Plato’s conception referred especially  to our 
suitability for life in an organized society and that he also astutely recognized our individual personality 
differences.  He appreciated the fact that we are not all just by nature, or that we always act accordingly. 
14 Epicurus, Golden Maxims No. 33, quoted in Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p. 124.  However, it is 
also true that Epicurus made reciprocity the basis of his social ethics and included an admonition against 
doing harm to others. See ‘Epicurus’, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicurus  (last modified 20 
July 2014). 
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Bentham, John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo.15  Other theorists associated with the 
“tradition of discourse” have advanced radically differing assumptions about human 
nature and social justice.  For instance, the controversial English philosopher (and 
tutor to the very wealthy) Thomas Hobbes proceeded from a very dark view of human 
nature.  In his best-known work, the Leviathan (from the Hebrew word for sea monster) 
in 1651, Hobbes wrote:  “I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and 
restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.  And the cause of this is 
not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained 
to…but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well…without the 
acquisition of more.”16 Accordingly, Hobbes advanced a case for rule by an all-
powerful sovereign “policeman” – a kind of flip side to Plato’s benevolent ruler. 
John Locke, by contrast, was a moderate, ethically-minded Christian who was also 
a practicing physician, and, in his Two Treatises of Government, he specifically refuted 
Hobbes’s absolutism about human nature and his authoritarian vision of the role of 
government.  Locke’s seminal work proceeded from the assumption that all men 
started out being free and equal in “the state of nature” and willingly cooperated with 
one another for their mutual advantage.  So when they came together voluntarily to 
form a more advantageous social contract, they retained their fundamental rights, 
especially their property rights.  Among other things, Locke argued that societies do 
not create property.  Each of us does so when we “mix” our labor with an object, or a 
piece of land.17  
A third alternative is associated with egalitarian socialism, the idea of individual 
equality in a community of equals. The roots of this paradigm can be traced back to 
some of the “radical” (i.e., more liberal) Sophists and early Christians, but the modern-
day inspiration for this theme is Jean Jacques Rousseau.  Rousseau believed 
passionately that humans are naturally good and cooperative and that they are 
inherently social beings who are suited by nature for living in communal (and moral) 
societies.  To Rousseau, the community as a whole – as a sort of moral being – has a 
higher claim than our individual rights.  “The right which each individual has to his 
15 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, [1789], London, P. Athlone, 1970, 
chap.1, sec.1. Also, John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, London, Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1863; David Ricardo, 
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation [1817], in Piero Sraffa (ed.), Works and Correspondence of David 
Ricardo, Volume I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1951. 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: On the Matter Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, [1651], 
(New York, Collier Books, 1962), Ch. XI. 
17 John L. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, [1690], P. Laslett, (ed.), (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1970), Ch. II, III, V 
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own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all.”  
Indeed, “the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights.”18  
FAIRNESS AND THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN NATURE 
It should be evident from this very cursory summary that there have been widely 
differing views through the ages about the nature of human nature, and of society, and 
that these have been used to justify various social and political prescriptions.  
However, we are now at a turning point in the relationship between science and our 
social and political philosophy.  It is increasingly clear that the tradition of discourse 
will no longer suffice for understanding the nature and purpose of human societies.  In 
evolutionary biology, the long-standing reductionist, gene-centered model known as 
neo-Darwinism is giving way to a new paradigm that emphasizes multi-level causation 
and the role of cooperation and emergent, synergistic phenomena in evolution.19 This 
new paradigm has major implications for our understanding of humankind and 
human evolution (see below).  Equally important, the assumptions that have animated 
our theories about human nature can now be tested against a rapidly accumulating 
body of compelling scientific research on this subject.  
First and foremost, we now recognize that human nature was shaped in the 
pressure-cooker of human evolution.20 The origins of human societies can be traced 
back several million years to a pattern of joint ventures -- limited cooperative efforts -- 
among small groups of close kin, and (most likely) some non-kin as well, to cope with 
the rigors of survival in a resource-rich but challenging environment.  Survival and 
reproduction was the basic problem, and our ancestral social contract involved, in 
effect, a “collective survival enterprise.”  Our ancestors, like ourselves, benefited from 
close cooperation with others in providing for their basic survival needs, including 
especially joint foraging and defense against predators.  Over time, other forms of 
cooperation were added.  
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, [1762], Trans. Charles M. Sherover, (New York, Harper & 
Row, 1984), I, ix, I, i. 
19 This important sea change is discussed in depth in Peter A. Corning, Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, 
Cybernetics and the Bioeconomics of Evolution, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005). Also, see Peter A. 
Corning, ‘Rotating the Necker Cube: A Bioeconomic Approach to Cooperation and the Causal Role of 
Synergy’, Journal of Bioeconomics, 15, (2013), pp. 171-193. 
20 For a more detailed brief account of human evolution, see Peter A. Corning, Nature’s Magic; Synergy in 
Evolution and the Fate of Humankind, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, and the references 
therein.  Also relevant are the extensive book-length treatments by Richard G. Klein, The Human Career: 
Human Biological and Cultural Origins, 2nd ed.,  Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999; Milford H. 
Wolpoff, Paleoanthropology,  2nd ed.,  New York, McGraw-Hill, 1999; Paul R. Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes 
Cultures and the Human Prospect, Washington, D.C., Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2000. 
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So it seems that Charles Darwin – not his many interpreters and miss-interpreters 
– was right after all when he reasoned, in The Descent of Man, that our social and moral 
attributes are of the utmost importance to our success as a species.  As Darwin put it,  
the “tribes” that were the most highly endowed with “patriotism, fidelity, 
obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to 
sacrifice themselves for the common good” would have had a decisive 
competitive advantage in the evolutionary process. “Selfish and contentious 
people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected…Thus 
the social and moral qualities would slowly tend to advance and be diffused 
throughout the world.”21 
In addition to the gradually accumulating evidence about events and processes that 
occurred long ago in the deep mists of our evolutionary pre-history, we can also test 
this (more authentic) “Darwinian” scenario against what the burgeoning science of 
human nature has been learning about our species.  In fact, there are perhaps 20 
distinct research domains, depending upon how you count, spanning at least 10 
different academic disciplines, all of which have something to say about this issue.  
These research domains include animal behavior studies (especially with primates), 
archaeology, anthropology, behavior genetics, the brain sciences, the cognitive 
sciences, child development, evolutionary psychology, sociology, political science, and 
behavioral and experimental economics.  Among other topics, a significant portion of 
this work has been focused on documenting our unique, biologically-grounded “social 
and moral” faculties.  Here (briefly) is a sampler of six of these research domains.  A 
more extended discussion can be found in my 2011 book, The Fair Society.  
Animal behavior:  Some of the most compelling evidence that moral behaviors 
and a sense of “justice” are evolved and biologically grounded – just as Plato (and 
Darwin) supposed – can be found in the research in animal behavior, especially among 
our close primate relatives.  Our (relatively) small-brained cousin species display many 
of the same traits, at least in rudimentary form, that are widely observed in humans.  
As the distinguished primatologist Frans de Waal has documented in several important 
books – with suggestive titles like Chimpanzee Politics, Good Natured, Our Inner Ape, and 
Primates and Philosophers -- chimpanzees and bonobos in particular have very complex, 
though varying, social and political lives.22  These non-human primates display many 
traits that are also commonplace among humans: reciprocity (especially food sharing), 
21 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex [1871],  New York, A. L. Burt, 1874, p. 
148. 
22 Frans B.M. de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes., New York, Harper & Row, 1982;  
Good Natured: The Origin of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1996); Our Inner Ape,  New York, Riverhead Books, 2005;  Primates and Philosophers: How 
Morality Evolved, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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capacities for empathy and consolation, conflict resolution techniques, community 
concern, deterrents and punishments for cheating, and a rudimentary form of “justice” 
in the form of a tit-for-tat for favors and transgressions. 
Anthropology:  The Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) at Yale University 
contain a priceless trove of data from literally thousands of field studies by 
anthropologists (and now archeologists as well) in every corner and crevice of the 
world.  Over the more than 60 years of its existence, the HRAF (which is actually 
consortium of more than 300 academic institutions world-wide) has assembled a data 
base that encompasses about 400 different cultures, both past and present, with 
information indexed down to the paragraph level.  What this extensive research 
library overwhelmingly confirms is that there is indeed a universal human nature – just 
what one would expect if we all shared common ancestors despite our obvious though 
superficial cultural differences.  Some years ago,  anthropologist Donald Brown used 
this data trove to assemble a comprehensive list of Human Universals (the title of his 
landmark 1991 book).23  To almost everyone’s surprise at the time, because 
anthropologists had been so fixated on the differences between cultures, Brown found 
literally hundreds of cultural universals.  For our purpose, the most important 
commonalities that Brown identified were those that affect our social, economic and 
political relationships – widespread cooperation, collective decision making, political 
coalitions, resistance to power and dominance, formal rights and obligations (rules and 
laws), governance processes, social sanctions, and, yes, reciprocity and a sense of 
fairness or equity.  
 Behavioral Genetics:  This important inter-discipline, which melds psychology 
and various biological sciences, has had a checkered history.24 Nevertheless, during the 
past century the science of behavioral genetics has made impressive though mostly 
quiet progress in illuminating the role of the genes in shaping our behavioral 
propensities – human nature – just as our genes shape the rest of our physiology.25  
What behavioral geneticists have shown beyond any reasonable – or even 
unreasonable – doubt is that our genes play a significant role not only in the 
overwhelming majority of our behavioral commonalities but also in our many subtle 
but important individual differences.  Literally dozens of studies have shown that 
between 40 and 50 percent of the total variation among us in terms of where we fit on 
23 Donald E. Brown, Human Universals, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1991). 
24 See Robert Plomin, John C. Defries, and Gerald E. McClearn,  Behavioral Genetics: A Primer,  New York, 
W. H. Freeman, 1990. 
25 Thomas J. Bouchard, 2004.  ‘Genetic Influence on Human Psychological Traits’,  Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, vol.13, no. 4, 2004, pp. 148-151. Also, Robert Plomin and John C. DeFries, ‘The 
Genetics of Cognitive Abilities and Disabilities’, Scientific American,  278, no. 5 (1998):. 62-68. 
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what psychologists refer to as the “Big Five” personality dimensions, as measured by 
various psychological tests (introversion-extroversion, conscientious-disorganized, 
calm-nervous, agreeable-disagreeable, and open- or closed-minded), is due to 
genetically-based variation (or heritability).   Similar results have been found for many 
of the specific traits that are associated with a sense of fairness.  For example, one large 
study involving 500 twin pairs found genetically based variances of 51 percent for 
“altruism”, 51 percent for “empathy” and 43 percent for “nurturance” – traits that are 
all associated with fairness behaviors.26 
The Brain Sciences:  In the roughly 150 years of their existence, the brain 
sciences have learned a great deal about the functional organization of the brain and 
how its many distinct parts interact.  Entire textbooks are devoted to elucidating the 
anatomy of the brain.  There is also a large and still expanding research literature on 
the physiological and behavioral consequences of various kinds of brain damage (with 
a distressing number of recent additions due to the war in Iraq).  The complex 
biochemistry and electrical properties of the brain are now also more clearly 
understood.  In addition, we are beginning to get a fix on the brain as a complex 
system – how the brain performs specific functions like vision and speech.  For 
instance, some 50 areas of the brain are associated with how we are able to see and 
interpret our surroundings.27  As for our moral impulses, Michael Gazzaniga, one of 
the world’s leading brain scientists, posed the following question in his 2005 book, The 
Ethical Brain:  “Do we have an innate moral sense as a species…?”28 His answer was 
unequivocally yes.  Gazzaniga’s views were seconded by the distinguished 
neurobiologist Donald Pfaff in his provocative book The Neuroscience of Fair Play: Why 
We (Usually) Follow the Golden Rule. “I believe that we are wired to behave in an ethical 
manner toward others, and they toward us,” he concludes.29  Among the growing 
body of supportive experimental research is the series conducted by Joshua Greene 
and his colleagues which identified specific brain areas associated with making moral 
26 J. Philippe Rushton, David W. Fulker, Michael C. Neal, David K.B. Nias, and Hans J. Eysenck, 
‘Altruism and Aggression: The Heritability of Individual Differences’,  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 50, (1986): 1192-1198.   The important new science of genomics, based on the recently developed 
ability to de-code genetic sequences directly, promises to greatly expand on our understanding of the 
relationship between our genes and our behavior in the years ahead 
27 See  Fred Delcomyn,  Foundations of Neurobiology,  (New York, Freeman, 1998).  Also Mark F. Bear, Barry 
W. Connors, and Michael A. Paradiso,  Neuroscience: Exploring the Brain.  3rd ed,  (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 
Williams & Wilkins, 2007); David H. Hubel and Torsten N. Wiesel, ‘Brain Mechanisms of Vision’,  
Scientific American, 241, no. 3, (1979): 130-144. 
28 Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain,  (New York, Dana Press, 2005),  p. 165. 
29 Donald W. Pfaff, The Neuroscience of Fair Play: Why We (Usually) Follow the Golden Rule, (New York, Dana 
Press, 2007),  p. 4. 
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choices.30  Another team, headed by Alan Sanfey, pinpointed a brain area associated 
with feelings of fairness and unfairness when subjects were participating in the so-
called “ultimatum game” in his laboratory.31 Yet another source of evidence involves 
the biochemistry of the brain.  In a series of laboratory experiments, neuroeconomist 
Paul Zak and his colleagues have demonstrated that a uniquely mammalian brain 
chemical, oxytocin, is strongly associated with acts of giving and reciprocating.  
Indeed, artificial enhancement of oxytocin levels in the brain can augment these 
behavioral effects.32  
Evolutionary Psychology:  This relatively new sub-discipline of psychology 
aspires to explain a wide range of psychological phenomena in terms of natural 
selection and our evolutionary history as a species.33 Two of the research domains in 
evolutionary psychology are particularly relevant here. One is the work of Leda 
Cosmides and John Tooby and a number of their colleagues on what they term “social 
exchange” (or reciprocity).34 They note that social exchange is both pan-human and 
very ancient, and they believe that reciprocity is an important element of human 
nature; there are specific neurocognitive features in the human brain (what they refer 
to as “mental modules”) that are designed for reasoning about social exchanges and, 
especially, for detecting “cheaters.”  Over the years, Cosmides and Tooby, along with 
a number of other researchers, have done extensive experimental research on this issue 
in various societies, using psychological testing tools such as the Wason selection task, 
and they have shown that expectations of reciprocity and cheater detection are highly 
specific skills that seem to involve a “dedicated system.”  Even three-year-olds are very 
good at it, and schizophrenics with impaired general reasoning abilities nevertheless 
are still able to detect cheaters in social exchanges.  The other research domain in 
evolutionary psychology that is important to a science of fairness is the work of Dennis 
Krebs and others on the evolution and development (ontogeny) of morality in children 
– again affirming one of Darwin’s insights and building on the pioneering work of 
child psychologists Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.  Not only is morality a 
30 Joshua Greene, ‘Emotion and Cognition in Moral Judgment: Evidence from Neuroimaging’, in Jean-
Pierre Changeux, Antonio R. Damasio, Wolf Singer, and Yves Christen, (eds.), Neurobiology of Human 
Values, (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2005), pp. 57-66. 
31 Alan G. Sanfey,  ‘Social Decision-making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience’,  Science, 318, 
(2007):. 598-602. 
32 Paul J. Zak, The Moral Molecule: The Source of Love and Prosperity, (New York, Dutton, 2012). 
33 A definitive overview of the field can be found in David Buss (ed.),  The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology,  
(Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2005). 
34 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, ‘Neurocognitive Adaptations Designed for social Exchange’, in Buss 
(ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, pp. 584-627. 
                                                          
 PETER A. CORNING 29 
universal trait in the human species, but it develops in each child in distinct, well-
understood stages and plays a critically important role in our social relationships.35 
Experimental and Behavioral Economics:  What has been termed “traditional 
economics” (the so-called neo-classical paradigm) involves a set of ideas, backed by 
mathematical models, that have dominated economic theory for over a century and 
have deeply influenced generations of economists and their students.36  This orthodoxy 
is grounded in the core assumption that people will act “rationally” in pursuing 
whatever their self-interests may be, meaning that they will seek out the most efficient 
and effective outcomes.  However, as we have lately observed, sometimes people may 
behave in very irrational ways.  Twentieth century economist John Maynard Keynes’s 
famous term “animal spirits” (inspired perhaps by Plato) has recently come back into 
vogue.37 This aspect of human nature was highlighted in a 2009 book, Animals Spirits, 
by economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller.  In the authors’ words: “Much 
economic activity is governed by animal spirits.  People have non-economic motives. 
And they are not always rational in pursuit of their economic interests.”38 The authors 
argue that fairness is one of these non-economic motives, and their conclusion is 
supported by a rapidly growing body of experimental research in economics, most 
notably in a construct  called “strong reciprocity theory.”  A clutch of theorists, 
including Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Joseph 
Henrich, Robert Boyd, Peter Richerson, Carl Sigmund and others have amassed a 
large body of evidence – using the paradigm known as the “ultimatum game” -- 
showing that even altruistic behaviors can be elicited in cooperative situations if there 
is a combination of strict reciprocity and punishments for defectors.  These theorists 
conclude that strong reciprocity is one of the core aspects of human morality and that 
it has played a vital role in our evolution as a species.39 
35 Dennis Krebs, ‘The Evolution of Morality’, in The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, pp. 747-775.  For 
overviews of the path-breaking work of child psychologists Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg on the 
development of morality in children, see Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, (London, Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co., 1932); Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of 
Moral Development, (San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1981); Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine, and 
Alexandra Hewer, Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics, (Basel, Switzerland and New 
York: Karger, 1983). 
36 For a comprehensive overview and critique, see Eric D. Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, 
Complexity and the Radical Remaking of Economics, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 2006. 
37 John Maynard Keynes,  The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1936). 
38 George A. Akerlof  and Robert J. Shiller,  Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why 
It Matters for Global Capitalism,  Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. ix. 
39 Strong reciprocity theory, and the growing research literature associated with it, is discussed in some 
detail in Peter A. Corning, Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, Cybernetics and the Bioeconomics of Evolution, Chicago, 
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In short, Plato got it right. We seem to be (mostly) ‘just by nature.’  But there are 
three important caveats that must be added to this general conclusion.  One is the 
accumulating evidence across a number of disciplines suggesting that both 
ethnocentrism (loyalty to one's own group) and xenophobia (hostility toward other 
groups) are evolved psychological propensities in humankind with a strong biological 
foundation and deep evolutionary roots.40 Thus, our sense of fairness and justice seems 
to have a sharply defined psychological boundary.  We readily extend help and may 
even display unconstrained altruism toward others with whom we identify as being 
members of our own “tribe”, but we can be indifferent to the sufferings of outsiders 
and may be quite willing to inflict harm on them if it suits our interests.  Behavioral 
economists call it “parochial altruism.” 
A second caveat is that all of our deeply-rooted “appetites”, predispositions, and 
emotions are malleable.  Our sense of fairness is embedded in our human nature, and 
we are (most of us) predisposed to act in ways that conform to the Golden Rule.41 But 
the specific content of our actions is also shaped by a combination of our personal 
experience, social norms, the immediate context, and the seductive lure of self-interest.  
We are highly vulnerable to the calculus -- often subconscious -- of what serves our 
personal agendas.  All too often we find rationalizations to justify rejecting other 
people’s fairness claims. 
 
The third caveat is that the science of human nature has also confirmed the 
necessity for taking into account the intractable fact that biologically-based individual 
differences shape our personalities and behavior, for better or worse.  Our 
University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp. 156-157.  See also Herbert Gintis, ‘Punishment and Cooperation’, 
Science, Vol. 319, 2008, pp. 1345-1346; Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, 
(eds.), Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life, Cambridge, MA, 
The MIT Press, 2005; Herbert Gintis and Ernst Fehr, ‘Human Nature and Social Cooperation’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, vol. 33, no. 3, 2007, pp. 1-22. 
40 There is more on this subject in Corning, The Fair Society, pp. 40-42,70. Also, see the classic study by 
Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1978; also 
Hammond, Ross A. and Robert Axelrod, ‘The Evolution of Ethnocentrism’, Journal of Conflict Resolution,  
vol. 50, no. 6, 2006, pp. 926–936. 
41 For an extended discussion of the universal cultural embrace of the Golden Rule (do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you), see Corning, The Fair Society, pp. 27-30. There is also a voluminous 
scholarly literature on this subject, often included in  broader treatments of social justice.  See especially, 
Robert J. McShea, Morality and Human Nature: A New Route to Ethical Theory,  Philadelphia, Temple 
University Press, 1990; Jeffrey Wattles, The Golden Rule, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996; Robert 
C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy, (eds.),  What is Justice? Classic and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2000; David Daiches Raphael, Concepts of Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
2001. 
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predisposition toward fairness, like every other biological trait, is subject to significant 
individual variation.  Numerous studies have indicated that some 20-30 percent of us 
are more or less “fairness challenged.”42 Some of us are so self-absorbed and 
egocentric that we are totally insensitive and even hostile to the needs of others.   This 
is most obvious when we are dealing with the extremes – the ruthless egoists that 
almost everyone in the business world has had to deal with (often in court), as well as 
the sociopaths and psychopaths for whom fairness is an incomprehensible concept.  By 
the same token, our very real differences in terms of talent, ability and personal 
accomplishments play a very important role in how we define fairness.  When we 
undertake the task of formulating a new “biosocial contract” below, we will need to 
take account of these individual differences.  
THE “COLLECTIVE SURVIVAL ENTERPRISE” 
Finally, and most important, there is a huge and profoundly significant omission from 
the emerging picture of human nature as it has been characterized (as a rule) by our 
social scientists.  Often they overlook the most fundamental question of all: What is the 
underlying purpose of human nature – and of society?  What are the sources of our 
interests -- the roots of our “revealed preferences”?  And what motivates the conflicts 
that challenge our sense of fairness and justice?  
Here a biological approach can provide a scientific perspective.  The ground-zero 
premise (so to speak) of the biological sciences is that survival and reproduction is the 
basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; life is at bottom a 
“survival enterprise.” Furthermore, the survival and reproduction problem is multi-
faceted and relentless.  It is a problem that can never be permanently solved.  Thus, an 
organized, interdependent society is quintessentially a “collective survival enterprise” 
(again confirming Plato’s insight).    
This tap-root assumption about the human condition is hardly news, but we very 
often deny it, or downgrade it, or simply lose touch with it.  Our fundamental 
collective purpose is to provide for the basic survival and reproductive needs of our 
people -- past, present and future.  In effect, we are all parties to a biologically-based 
social contract. (In fact, humans are not unique in this respect; other socially-organized 
species in the natural world have a similar kind of implicit biological contract.) 
42 This is especially evident in the research on strong reciprocity theory (see the references cited in 
footnote 38). See also Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, ‘Is Equality Passé?: Homo Reciprocans and the 
Future of Egalitarian Politics’,  Boston Review (Fall 1998):  4-10.  But the most decisive confirmations can be 
found in the growing research literature in behavioral genetics.  See Plomin et al., Behavioral Genetics 
(footnote 24). 
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This “biosocial” contract, and the imperatives (and rules) associated with it, 
encompasses the preponderance of human activity, and human choices, worldwide.  
To be sure, survival per se may be the furthest thing from our conscious minds as we go 
about our daily lives.  Nevertheless, our mundane daily routines are mostly 
instrumental to meeting the underlying survival challenge.  They reflect the particular 
survival strategy -- the package of cultural, economic, and political tools -- by which 
each society organizes and pursues the ongoing survival enterprise.43  
Accordingly, we are endowed with an array of biologically-grounded 
“preferences” (in the argot of economics) that are virtually universal, and we mostly 
choose to follow their dictates.  Moreover, all preferences are not created equal.  This 
allows us to seek regularities, make “if-then” predictions and link human nature to 
human behavior, including our social ethics, in comprehensible ways. (A more detailed 
discussion of these points can be found in The Fair Society.) 
Very briefly, the first and most important generalization about human nature is 
that each of us is defined, in considerable measure, by an array of “basic needs” that 
are essential to our survival and reproductive success, and we come into the world 
being oriented to the satisfaction of these needs.  The concept of basic needs is hardly 
new, needless to say.  Its roots go back at least to Plato, who (it will be recalled) 
correctly identified our basic needs as the basis for any organized society.    
Over the years, there have been various psychological and ethical definitions of 
basic needs that downplay and even discount the ongoing challenge of biological 
survival and reproduction.4444 This contrasts sharply with the large body of empirical 
research, most notably under the sponsorship of the United Nations, the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences, the World Bank and other agencies, that gives scientific 
credence and considerable precision to the concept of basic needs.45   
In addition, the so-called Survival Indicators project at our research institute has 
involved an effort to develop and validate measuring-rods for the full range of survival 
requisites for an individual or a population.46  There are, in fact, no less than 14 
43 This subject is discussed at greater length in Corning, Holistic Darwinism and The Fair Society.  It is worth 
noting the resonance here with the eighteenth century English philosopher Edmund Burke’s famous, 
much-quoted passage: “Society is indeed a contract…[But] as the ends of such a partnership cannot be 
obtained by many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but 
between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born…” Edmund Burke, in 
J.A. Burke and R.L. Hamer (eds.), Works of Edmund Burke, vol. 2, (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1999), p. 
368. 
44 This literature is reviewed in Corning, The Fair Society, Ch. 5, pp.  87-111. 
45 See Corning, The Fair Society, Ch. 5. 
46 The “Survival Indicators” project is discussed in detail in Corning, Holistic Darwinism and The Fair Society, 
Ch. 5. 
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“primary needs” domains that have been identified and documented.  These represent 
biological imperatives in any given society or personal situation, in conjunction with 
an indeterminate number of context-specific “instrumental needs.” (Primary needs are 
irreducible and vary within well-defined parameters, but instrumental needs vary 
widely and are often highly localized in nature.)  Needless to say, this broad 
formulation cuts a very wide swath through any complex economy, and these 14 basic 
needs represent the empirical foundation for any biologically-grounded social contract. 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REVISITED 
The idea that there is a more or less well-defined “social contract” in every society 
traces back to the Sophists, and to Plato.  But it is more commonly associated with the 
so-called social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – such as 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke – and more recently, John 
Rawls.  Rousseau fantasized about free individuals voluntarily forming communities in 
which everyone was equal and all were subject to the “general will.”47  Hobbes, in 
contrast, envisioned a natural state of anarchic violence and proposed, for the sake of 
mutual self-preservation, that everyone should be subject to the absolute “sovereign” 
authority of the state.48  Locke, on the other hand, rejected this dark Hobbesian vision.  
He conjured instead a benign state of nature in which free individuals voluntarily 
formed a limited contract for their mutual advantage but retained various residual 
rights.49 
The philosopher David Hume, and many others since, have made a hash of this 
line of reasoning.  In his devastating critique, A Treatise of Human Nature (published in 
1739-40), Hume rejected the claim that some deep property of the natural world 
(natural laws), or some aspect of our past history, could be used to justify moral 
precepts.  Among other things, Hume pointed out that even if the origins of human 
societies actually conformed to such hypothetical motivations and scenarios (which we 
now know they did not), we have no logical obligation to accept an outdated social 
contract that was entered into by some remote ancestor.50  Modern scholars frequently 
refer to this supposed taboo against any scientific basis for morality as the “naturalistic 
fallacy,” a term coined by philosopher George Edward Moore.51  
47 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, Book II, 1. 
48 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 17, 18. 
49 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Ch. II. 
50 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, [1739-40],  2nd ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, (ed.), (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1978). 
51 See George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica,[1903], rev. ed.,( Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p.58ff. 
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With the demise of the natural law argument, social contract theory has generally 
fallen into disfavor among philosophers, with the important exception of the work of 
John Rawls.  In his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls provoked a widespread 
reconsideration of what constitutes fairness and social justice and, equally important, 
what precepts would produce a just society.52  Rawls proposed two complementary 
principles: (1) equality in the enjoyment of freedom (a concept fraught with 
complications), and (2) affirmative action (in effect) for “the least advantaged” among 
us.  This would be achieved by ensuring that the poor have equal opportunities and 
that they would receive a relatively larger share of any new wealth whenever the 
economic pie grows larger.  Although Rawls’ work has been exhaustively debated by 
philosophers and others over the years, it seems to have had no discernable effect 
outside of academia. 
However, there is one other major exception to the general decline of social 
contract theory that is perhaps more significant theoretically.  Over the past two 
decades, a number of behavioral economists, game theorists, evolutionary 
psychologists and others have breathed new life into this venerable idea with a 
combination of rigorous, mathematically-based game theory models and empirical 
research.  Especially important is the work of the mathematician-turned-economist 
Ken Binmore, who has sought to use game theory as a tool for resuscitating social 
contract theory on a new footing.  In his 2005 book, Natural Justice, Binmore describes 
his approach as a “scientific theory of justice,” because it is based on an 
evolutionary/adaptive perspective, as well as the growing body of research in 
behavioral and experimental economics regarding our evolved sense of fairness, plus 
some powerful insights from game theory.53 
Briefly, Binmore defines a social contract in very broad terms as any stable 
“coordination” of social behavior – like our conventions about which side of the road 
we should drive on or pedestrian traffic patterns on sidewalks.  Any sustained social 
interaction in what Binmore refers to as “the game of life” – say a marriage, a car 
pool, or a bowling league -- represents a tacit social contract if it is (1) stable, (2) 
efficient, and (3) fair.  
To achieve a stable social contract, Binmore argues, a social relationship should 
strive for an equilibrium condition – an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in game 
theory.  That is, the rewards or “payoffs” for each of the players should be optimized 
so that no one can improve on his or her own situation without exacting a 
destabilizing cost from the other cooperators.  Ideally, then, a social contract is self-
52 John Rawls,  A Theory of Justice,( Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1971). 
53 Ken Binmore,  Natural Justice, (Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2005), pp. 157-158 
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enforcing.  As Binmore explains, it needs no social “glue” to hold it together (much less 
a Hobbesian sovereign) because everyone is a willing participant and nobody has a 
better alternative.  It is like a masonry arch that requires no mortar (a simile first used 
by Hume). 
The problem with this formulation – as Binmore recognizes -- is that it omits the 
radioactive core of the problem – how do you define fairness in substantive terms?  As 
Binmore concedes, game theory “has no substantive content…It isn’t our business to 
say what people ought to like.”54 Binmore rejects the very notion that there can be any 
universals where fairness is concerned.  “The idea of a need is particularly fuzzy,” he 
tells us.55  In other words, Binmore’s version of a social contract involves an 
idealization, much like Plato’s republic, or (utopian) free market capitalism, or Karl 
Marx’s utopian socialism.  Fairness is whatever people say it is, so long as they agree. 
THE BIOSOCIAL CONTRACT 
I have taken a ifferent approach. What I call a “biosocial contract” is distinctive in that 
it is grounded in our growing understanding of human nature and the basic 
(biological) purpose of a human society.  It is focused on the content of fairness, and it 
encompasses a set of specific normative precepts.  In the game theory paradigm, the 
social contract is all about harmonizing our personal interactions.  Well and good, as 
the saying goes.  But in a biosocial contract, the players include all of the stakeholders 
in the political community and substantive fairness is the focus.   
First and foremost, a biosocial contract requires a major shift in our social values.  
As noted above, the deep purpose of a human society is not, after all, about achieving 
growth, or wealth, or material affluence, or power, or social equality, or even about 
the pursuit of happiness.  To repeat, an organized society is quintessentially a 
“collective survival enterprise.”  Whatever may be our perceptions, aspirations, or 
illusions (or for that matter, whatever our station in life), the basic problem for any 
society is to provide for the survival and reproductive needs of its members.   
However, it is also important to recognize our differences in merit and to reward 
them (or punish them) accordingly.  It is clear that “just deserts” (or Aristotle’s 
“proportionate equality”) is also fundamental to our sense of fairness.  Finally, there 
must also be reciprocity -- an unequivocal commitment on the part of all of the 
participants to help support the collective survival enterprise, for no society can long 
exist on a diet of altruism.  Altruism is a means to a larger end, not an end in itself.  It 
is the emotional and normative basis of any society’s “safety-net.”    
54 Quoted in Corning, The Fair Society, p. 80. 
55 Binmore, Natural Justice, p. 171. 
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Accordingly, the biosocial contract paradigm encompasses three distinct 
normative (and policy) precepts that must be bundled together and balanced in order 
to approximate the Platonic ideal of social justice.  These precepts are as follows: 
(1) Goods and services must be distributed to each according to his or her basic 
needs (in this, there must be equality); 
(2) Surpluses beyond the provisioning of our basic needs must be distributed 
according to “merit” (there must also be equity); 
(3) In return, each of us is obligated to contribute to the collective survival 
enterprise proportionately in accordance with our ability (there must be 
reciprocity). 
The first of these precepts, equality, involves a collective obligation to provide for 
the basic needs of all of our people.  I refer to it as a “basic needs guarantee.”  It is 
grounded in four empirical propositions: (1) our basic needs are increasingly well-
documented; (2) although our individual needs may vary somewhat, in general they 
are equally shared; (3) we are dependent upon many others, and our economy as a 
whole, for the satisfaction of these needs; and (4) more or less severe harm will result if 
any of these needs are not satisfied. (All of this is discussed at length in The Fair Society.) 
Although the first precept may sound socialistic -- an echo of Karl Marx’s famous 
dictum -- it is at once far more specific and more limited.56 It is not about an equal 
share of the wealth.  It refers to the fourteen basic biological needs domains that are 
detailed in my book.  Our basic needs are not a vague, open-ended abstraction, nor a 
matter of personal preference.  They constitute a concrete but ultimately limited 
agenda, with measurable indicators for assessing outcomes. 
The idea that there is a “social right” to the necessities of life is not new.  It is 
implicit in the Golden Rule, the great moral precept that is recognized by every major 
religion and culture.  There is also a substantial scholarly literature on the need to 
establish constitutional and legal protections for social/economic rights that are 
comparable to political rights.57  Indeed, three important formal covenants have 
56 Equality has been a socialist and liberal/progressive ideal ever since the Enlightenment. See especially 
the discussion in Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do, (New York, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2009).  Many theorists have focused on equality in terms of human rights, economic 
opportunities, or due process of law.  However, economic egalitarians, beginning with Rousseau and 
including Karl Marx, have stressed an egalitarian distribution of the wealth and property of a society.  
From the perspective of the three fairness precepts in the biosocial contract paradigm, the radical socialist 
ideal is misguided.  Or, better said, it must be strictly limited to the domain in which we are indeed equal 
– our basic needs. This leaves ample room for differentially rewarding our inequalities in talent, efforts 
and achievements. (The shortcomings of both socialism and capitalism are discussed in depth in my book.) 
57 See for example Cécile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life,  Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000.  The abstract for the book notes that “The desirability, or lack thereof, of 
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endorsed social rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the 
United Nations (1948),58 the European Social Charter (1961),59  and the United 
Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966),60 
although these documents have been widely treated as aspirational rather than being 
legally enforceable.61   
Perhaps more significant is the evidence of broad public support for the underlying 
principle of social rights.  Numerous public opinion surveys over the years have 
consistently shown that people are far more willing to provide aid for the genuinely 
needy than neo-classical (rational self-interest) economic theory would lead one to 
believe.  (Some of these surveys are cited in my book.)   
Even more compelling evidence of public support for social rights, I believe, can 
be found in the results of an extensive series of social experiments regarding 
distributive justice by political scientists Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer and 
their colleagues, as detailed in their 1992 book Choosing Justice.62  What Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer set out to test was whether or not ad hoc groups of “impartial” decision-
bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. 
Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate 
minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. 
The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, 
and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, 
the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the 
judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of 
those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political 
philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice.” 
58 The Universal Declaration included social (or “welfare”) rights that address matters such as education, 
food, and employment, though their inclusion has been the source of much controversy. See David 
Beetham, ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights?’, Political Studies, 43, Suppl. 1, (1995):. 41–60. 
59 The European Social Charter, enacted by the Council of Europe in 1961, also guaranteed economic 
and social rights. http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/ 
60 Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force ten years later, in January of 1976, 
declared in part: “In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” See 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm The list of specific rights in the Covenant includes 
nondiscrimination and equality for women in the economic and social area (Articles 2 and 3), freedom to 
work and opportunities to work (Article 4), fair pay and decent conditions of work (Article 7), the right to 
form trade unions and to strike (Article 8), social security (Article 9), special protections for mothers and 
children (Article 10), the right to adequate food, clothing, and housing (Article 11), the right to basic health 
services (Article 12), the right to education (Article 13), and the right to participate in cultural life and 
scientific progress (Article 15).. 
61 For a more detailed discussion of social rights, see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#EcoSocRig. 
62 Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, 
Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1992. 
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makers behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” about their own personal stakes would 
be able to reach a consensus on how to distribute the income of a hypothetical society.  
Frohlich and Oppenheimer found that the experimental groups consistently opted for 
striking a balance between maximizing income (providing incentives and rewards for 
“the fruits of one’s labors,” in the authors’ words) and ensuring that there is an 
economic minimum for everyone (what they called a “floor constraint”). The overall 
results were stunning: 77.8 percent of the groups chose to assure a minimum income 
for basic needs.   
The results of these important experiments, which have since been replicated 
many times, also lend strong support to the second of the three fairness precepts listed 
above concerning equity (or merit).  How can we also be fair-minded about rewarding 
our many individual differences in talents, performance, and achievements?  Merit, 
like the term fairness itself, has an elusive quality; it does not denote some absolute 
standard.  It is relational, and context-specific, and subject to all manner of cultural 
norms and practices.  But, in general, it implies that the rewards a person receives 
should be proportionate to his or her effort, or investment, or contribution, as Plato 
and Aristotle insisted.   
However, a crucial corollary of the first two precepts is that the collective survival 
enterprise has always been based on mutualism and reciprocity, with altruism being 
limited (typically) to special circumstances under a distinct moral claim -- what could 
be referred to (in the insurance industry terminology) as “no-fault needs.”  So, to 
balance the scale, a third principle must be added to the biosocial contract, one that 
puts it squarely at odds with the utopian socialists, and perhaps even with some 
modern social democrats as well.   In any voluntary contractual arrangement, there is 
always reciprocity -- obligations or costs as well as benefits.  As noted earlier, 
reciprocity is a deeply rooted part of our social psychology and an indispensable 
mechanism for balancing our relationships with one another.  Without reciprocity, the 
first two fairness precepts might look like nothing more than a one-way scheme for 
redistributing wealth. 
Accordingly, these three fairness precepts – equality, equity and reciprocity – form the 
goal posts for a fair society, and they are the keys to achieving the objectives of 
voluntary consent, social harmony, and political legitimacy, I believe.  Moreover, they 
provide empirical support and add specificity to Plato’s vision of justice and a just 
society. 
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FINESSING THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY 
A biosocial contract is about the rights and duties of all of the stakeholders in society, 
both among themselves and in relation to the “state”.  It is about defining what 
constitutes a “fair society.”  It is a normative theory, but it is built on an empirical 
foundation.  I believe that it is legitimate to do so in this case, because life itself has a 
built-in normative bias – a normative preference, so to speak.  We share with all other 
living things the biological imperatives associated with survival and reproduction (our 
basic needs).  If we do, after all, want to survive and reproduce – if this is our shared 
biological objective -- then certain principles of social intercourse follow as essential 
means to this end.  In other words, a biosocial contract represents a “prudential” 
political road-map that ultimately depends upon mutual consent. 
 Of course, the much-debated logic of the “naturalistic fallacy” remains intact.  For 
most modern philosophers and social scientists, Hume’s prohibition against deriving a 
moral “ought” from an empirical “is” is absolutely sacred.  So a critic of the biosocial 
contract idea might ask: Why should we care about our survival and reproduction, 
much less that of anyone else in our society?  More to the point (especially if you are a 
follower of Ayn Rand’s egoistic philosophy),63 why should anyone -- especially the 
“haves” -- accept a fairness ethic as a standard for guiding the policies and practices of 
a society for the benefit of the have-nots?  Even if we have been “pre-programmed” by 
our evolutionary heritage to be concerned about fairness, how can anyone claim that 
this creates a moral imperative? 
Actually, these are the wrong questions.  They amount to a Sophist sand-trap. The 
issue here is not whether we can justify some categorical imperative for morality.  The 
reality is we do care. Given the cardinal facts that (1) we care intensely about satisfying 
our basic needs, (2) these needs must, by and large, be satisfied through the vast 
network of cooperative activities associated with the collective survival enterprise, and 
(3) we do, after all, have a shared sense of fairness, then the three precepts of the 
biosocial contract provide a compass for steering a society through the political shoals.  
They provide a set of prudential normative principles that direct us to navigate a 
middle-course between egoism and egalitarianism.  Moreover, these precepts represent 
existential imperatives in the sense that serious maladaptive consequences -- both 
individually and collectively -- will result from ignoring them and pursuing an 
alternate course 
These facts do not, of course, impose any logically necessary values, or “oughts.” 
But logic aside, they do impose inescapable choices: You can choose to pursue your 
63 Ayn Rand, 1943.  The Fountainhead [1943], New York, Penguin, 1993. Also Rand,   Atlas Shrugged, New 
York, Random House, 1997. For a critique of Rand’s extreme but very popular right-wing philosophy, see 
Corning, The Fair Society, pp. 33-35, plus an extended endnote, no. 3. 
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basic biological needs (the imperatives of survival and reproduction) just as our 
ancestors have done for millions of years – or not.  Likewise, you can choose to accept 
the terms of a legitimate (fair) social contract as an indispensable means for pursuing 
your needs within the collective survival enterprise – or not.  But these are unavoidable 
choices, and it’s very inconvenient to be dead.   
 CONCLUSION 
Reality is completely indifferent to our philosophies, so it would be advisable to deal 
with the facts of life in the spirit of science.  Indeed, everyday we unwittingly test the 
hypothesis that there is a real world out there (and in there) that is independent of our 
perceptions and philosophical conceits, and so do all the other untold trillions of living 
organisms.  For the daily process of living is, quintessentially, a matter of making 
choices.  To date, all the evidence (at least that we know of) has been supportive of this 
life-affirming hypothesis.  Accordingly, a philosophy that can embrace the intellectual 
challenges associated with understanding this biological reality will, in so doing, be 
exalted by the effort.  At its best, philosophy can ask the right questions about life and 
our place in it and can critically evaluate our very imperfect scientific enterprise.  It 
can shed more light on both the “is” and the “ought” of our existence.  All the rest will 
ultimately be condemned to irrelevance, alongside the perverse rationalizations of the 
global warming climate deniers.   
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